Halakhah su II Samuele 20:4

Rambam's ruling is based upon the explication of the narrative of II Samuel 20:4-22 found in the Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:12. Joab, commander of King David's troops, had pursued Sheba the son of Bichri and besieged the town of Abel in which Sheba sought refuge. Thereupon Joab demanded that Sheba be delivered to the king's forces; otherwise, Joab threatened to destroy the entire city. On the basis of the verse, "Sheba the son of Bichri has lifted up his hand against the king, against David" (II Samuel 20:21), Resh Lakish infers that acquiescence with a demand of such nature can be sanctioned only in instances in which the victim's life is lawfully forfeit, as was the case with regard to Sheba the son of Bichri who is described as being guilty of lèse majesté. However, in instances in which the designated victim is guiltless, all must suffer death rather than become accomplices to murder. R. Yoḥanan maintains that the question of guilt is irrelevant; rather, the crucial factor is the singling out of a specific individual by the oppressor. Members of a group have no right to select one of their number and deliver him to death in order to save their own lives. Since the life of each individual is of inestimable value there is no basis for preferring one life over another. However, once a specific person has been marked for death in any event, either alone if surrendered by his companions or together with the entire group if they refuse to comply, those who deliver him are not to be regarded as accessories. Rambam's ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Resh Lakish. Both opinions are cited by Rema, Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 157:1.²In the case of the hijacked airplane the passengers may be regarded as specified because, in the absence of intervention, they would all die. If intervention were sanctioned, sacrificing their lives would save others but there was no possibility of sacrificing others in order to save them. Nevertheless, even if victims are specified, R. Yoḥanan does not sanction actively hastening death in order to save others.

Maimonides' ruling is based upon the explication of the narrative of II Samuel 20:4–22 found in the Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:12. Joab, commander of King David's troops, had pursued Sheba the son of Bichri and beseiged him in the town of Abel and demanded that he be delivered to the king's forces. Otherwise Joab threatened to destroy the entire city. From the verse "Sheba the son of Bichri hath lifted up his hand against the king, against David" (20:21), Resh Lakish infers that acquiescence with this demand can be sanctioned only in instances where the victim's life is lawfully forfeit, as was the case with regard to Sheba the son of Bichri, who is described as being guilty of lèse majesté; in instances where the victim is innocent, all must suffer death rather than become accomplices to murder. R. Yochanan maintains that the question of guilt is irrelevant, but that the crucial element is rather the singling out of a specific individual. Members of a group have no right to select one of their number arbitrarily and deliver him to death in order to save themselves since the life of each individual is of inestimable value. However, once a specific person has been marked for death in any event, either alone if surrendered by his companions or together with the entire group if they refuse to comply, those who deliver him are not accounted as accessories. Maimonides' ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Resh Lakish.⁶²Rosh and Ran, however, both rule in accordance with the opinion of R. Yochanan; R. Moses Isserles, Yoreh De‘ah 157:1, cites both views without offering a definitive ruling.